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selling fish at the landings stage by auction, as
opposed to the current practices of selling to
middlemen and through cooperatives, has been proposed
by several authors. They suggest that fishermen would
receive higher prices and that auction competition
would improve fish quality.
The aim of this study was to compile the rules and
procedures of existing fish auctions, and to explore
their effect on price formation. This would provide a
basis for any who wished to determine the applicability
of fish auctions in particular ports.•
While the findings are relevant to all fish auctions,
special emphasis was placed on the performance of New
England's two existing fish auctions. Possible
improvements to those two auctions were shown4
The study found that where minimum requirements in
buyer competition and sales volume were met, fish
auction prices would accurately reflect value.
Fishermen often prefer stable and steadily increasing
profits over maximum profits, and thus they support
fish auctions on grounds other than that they give the
best prices4 Auctions are shown to be a very efficient
means of marketing fish in terms of time and
participant involvement, and are sometimes also used
because crews want prices to be publicly displayed4
• • -i, •• .' '.
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I. INTRODUCTION
selling fish at the landings stage by auction. as
opposed to the current practices of selling to
~iddlemen and through cooperatives. has been proposed
on the grounds that fishermen would receive higher
prices (Wilson. 1979). Fisher~en frequently complain
that they are not selling in a competitive aarket. that
they do not have enough market information. that they
have less market power than buyers. and that they
therefore do not receive the highes~ possible price.
They want the price they receive for their product to
reflect its performance on the market. rather than the
buyer's personal attitude. Also. they feel that they
have neither sufficient access to markets. nor the
mobility to move from one market to another as fishing
grounds change (Nichols. 1978).
Fish dealers. on the other hand. frequently
complain about the poor quality of fish they receive.
Wilson (1979) suggested that auction quality-price
differentials would increase fish quality by providing
fishermen with greater incentive to take proper care of
their catch.
To study-all the marketing alternatives available
to fisher.en would be far too great a task. This study
will focus on-auctions since they are one of the mos~
widespread marketing systems for fish in northern
Europe. since most American fishermen are unfamiliar
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with them, and since preliminary research shovs
potential for sucessful transfer.
This study is divided into three parts. The first
part of the study vill outline exactly what a marketing
system should do. The second part vill describe the
performance of existing fish auctions, both in Europe
and in the United States, in meeting these
expectations. Finally, this study will extrapolate on
the applicability of selling fish by auction in New
England.
and Lindbeck (1977) agree on the
of marketing systems. Hamely,
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II. WHAT ~ARKETING SYSTEMS DO
If one wishes to determine which type of marketing
systam would be most suitable for fUlfilling ones
needs, one .ust first know what it is that marketing
systems are supposed to do. Due to the nature of
western economies, this paper viII emphasize how the
price system performs the market functions.
1. Ka~ketin~~~~' Function§~
~arketing is a social function; it is the vay a
society supplies its physical or consumptive needs. If
every person, family or group could supply all its ovn
needs, then marketing would not exist. It overcomes
the "functional, informational, spatial, temporal and
financial" separations between producers and consumers
(So••ers. 1968, p.7).
Leftwich (1966)
five major functions
such a system must
1) transmit ~n~ormation concerning the
preferences of its participants;
2) allQcate ~esQqrces to the various
participants in accordance with their
preferences;
3) ~m2~ ~~~ic~ent EroductioB
~echnique~
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4) ~s1~ !ncen!i!~~ to invest and
produce, to develop new aethods of
prodnction, to use resources
economically; and finally
5) coo~d~2 the desires and decisions
of all the producers and all the
consumers so that the level of
production in each industry exactly
matches the demand.
These five functions can be regrouped into three:
the allocation of resources, the creation of production
incentives, and coordination.
2.1. ~asi£-f1;:i~e TheoU.:.
The price of an article is an expression of its
value or worth in exchange for other goods. Every
consumer owns a certain amount of resources and will
try to trade these for other types of resources until
he owns the mixture which is most satisfying to him, in
accordance with his personal preferences. The value of
an article is thus based on personal preferences. One
person may be willing to trade two fish for a loaf of
bread whereas another would only be willing to give
one. Or, correspondingly, one person might be willing
to accept one dollar per fish whereas another might be
page 5
unwilling to trade for less than two dollars per fish.
Not only can one talk about individual willingness
to buy or to supply, but the preferences of many
individuals can be considered collectively. Just as
one individual would only be willing to buy certain
quantities of an article at various prices, so would a
group of individuals, or society, change the quantity
it demands with price. A list of quantities demanded
corresponding to various prices is called a demand
schedule, or if one represents it graphically, a demand
curve. A graphical representation of willingness to
supply at different prices is likewise called a supply
curve.
Prices are formed in what is generally considered
to be a free market when parties wishing to bUy or sell
interact competitively. At the equilibrium price, all
sellers can find buyers and vice versa. The market can
be "cleared". If the price is too high, some sellers
will not be able to find buyers and will drop their
prices to lure buyers away frolll their co.petitors.. If
the price is too low, then all buyers can not find
suppliers and will raise their bid to divert supplies
from co.petitiors~ Underlying this is the assumption
that all buyers and sellers have knowledge of supply,
demand, prices, and act upon that knowledge so as to
maximize their profits. Finally, there must be enough
participants, and their share of the market activity
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small enough, so that the action of one party has no
effect upon the actions of any of the others.
If one is trying to maximize consumer
satisfaction, then one vould want prices to equal
average costs in order to get products at the least
price. Under competition, when profits appear, new
businesses are drawn into the industry until production
is such that prices again equal average costs.
An atomistic market is characterized by many small
sellers. The price of their product is determined by
demand and their collective willingness to supply_
Since none of the sellers has a significant level of
production, their individual actions do not affect
prices. They are price takers and adjust their own
production level in response. They will, in fact,
increase their output to that point vhere the marginal
cost of producing an additional unit will just equal
its selling price. If entry is easy, or if firms can
expand without increasing their unit cost, then
expansion viII occur until prices are so low that
a) "every firm is producing at the
minimal attainable unit cost,
b) market price is equal to this .inimal
cost, (which includes a normal profit),
c) industry output is the largest which
can be sold at a price covering cost,
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d) and there are no profits in excess of
the normal profits, (interest on owner's
investllent)," (saan, 1968, p.. 28) .•
In monopolized markets, there is no competition on
one side or the other. There may either be only one
oligopoly exists where there are few enough
or suppliers so that the actions of one will
affect his competitors. The behavior of an
lies somewhere between that of competitive
buyers
directly
oligopoly
manufacturer from whom all must buy, or, as in the case
of some fishing ports, only one buyer to whom all must
sell. Not being exposed to competition, monopolists
can hold their prices off the theoretical equilibriull
price to earn extra profits. It should be stressed
here, that when determining his willingness to supply,
a supplier takes into account not only his costs, but
also adds enough profit to aotivate himself. Thus
aonopolistic profits are those which are greater than
the level which competitors would be willing to accept.
Profits are considered normal by Shank (1919) if they
are at a level no higher than necessary to attract
capital.
An
and lIonopolistic markets.
2- 2. ~~;:fec:t_ l!arke:b,
In the perfect market, all buyers and all sellers
have perfect knOWledge of delland, supply, and prices.
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Fur~hermore, they are exposed ~o perfec~ compe~ition
and ac~ rationally upon tha~ knowledge in such a manner
as ~o maximize ~heir profits, (Shepherd, 1976).
Price differentials rela~ing ~o space, time and
form should equal corresponding cos~ differences4 If
buyers and produc~s are spread ou~ over space, ~hen a
.arke~ is s~ill perfec~ if cos~s a~ remo~e poin~s are
equal to cos~s a~ near poin~s plus ~he cost of
shipping. Likewise, a market is perfect over time if
prices during periods of relative scarcity equal prices
during times of abundance plus the cost of storag~
The classification of goods into classes and
grades makes the pricing process more objective.
Information on the prices of various classes and grades
can be qu~ckly transmitted, but to transmit a
description of each individual object would be too
cumbersome. Classification reduces the haggling and
bargaining abou~ what a particular lot is worth. Price
differences between grades should be relative to ~heir
different costs of production4
Perhaps the grea~est difficul~y in ever achieving
a perfect market lies in ~he requirement ~hat all
buyers and sellers have perfect knowledge of demand,
supply, and prices. The collec~ion of information is
cos~ly, and if the cos~s are significan~, ~hen some
sellers will agree to lower prices, rather than incur
the expense of searching for buyers who offer more,
(Alchian,
affected
1969). The
by economies
collection of
of size, and,
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information is
in the fish
industry, wholesalers have definite advantages over
fishermen.
Even thorough searches vill not reveal all market
information. Some market activity, such as private
contracting and direct ' marketing, show no outvard
signs. If their share of the market activity is
extensive, then cash markets vill not reflect overall
marke~ performance. To correct this, Bonn (1976)
suggests mandatory public reporting of all market
information.•
2.3. lllocattQO. _~oord~Dation, and Incentive§~
Ammihud (1976) and Shubik (1970) list several
methods by which resources can be allocated. It may be
done by chance, tradition, force, fraud and deceit,
higher authority, voting, planning, bidding and
auctioning, bargaining, or a price .echanisa in an
economic market. The use of the price mechanism is
usually justified on the basis of its efficient
creation of incentives, and coordination.•
Incentives for investment, for the develop.ent of
new prduction IRethods, and for the economical use of
resources are desirable.
Brittan (1975) decided that there were three ways
to get people to cooperate: by co.mand, through
. ~ .. .
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unenforced good behaviour. and by private interest to
provide for others. namely a market system. Although
production is sometimes a by-product of another
activity. as in the case of some sportsmen. the
incentive for most production is the expectation of
material gain. In the price mechanism. it is the force
of competition that brings developmen~s and economical
usages about. If one producer can find a way of
producing a product more cheaply than others can. he
will earn greater than normal profits. Competitors
will be drawn by ~hese excess profi~s ~o switch to his
production method. until all are using the innovation
and no excess profits exist.
The coordination of all the needs and wishes of
millions upon millions of members of a society is the
most intriguing market system function. No~ only must
each industry produce precisely the quantity of goods
wanted by each household. but it must fulfill the needs
of firms producing yet other goods as well.
On a lower scale. decisions could be made
democratically. if the number of decisions were not too
large. Lindbeck (1977l. however. concluded that on a
· na t i ona l level the only alternative to a market economy
would be a central planning syste.. A super computer
to figure everything 'out. he decided. would be too
co.plex..
The price mechanism coordinates by creating
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symbols (prices) that signify the rate of equivalence.
or value. of all things. These signals reflect where a
product comes from. how useful it is. its abundance.
the ' effort required for its production and
transportation. its longevity. and how many other
people want it. Thus. instead of the consuaer having
to know all the details concerning all the attributes
of a product. and the producer having to know the
desires of an entire society. these price signals
convey only the most essential information. and only to
those concerned.
Alfred Whitehead p~oposed that "civilization
advances by extending the number ' of important
operations which we can perform without thinking about
them" (Hayek. 1945. p.. 528).
One problem with the minimum of information passed
along by the price system is that people do not know
why they are made to do what they do. Accordingly.
monopolists can manipulate them with false price
signals..
Jacob !arschak. in his article on the economics of
language (Fish. 1967). recalls an exa.ple of a fighter
plane design where weight was crucial. All possible
messages required between the pilot and bomber could be
precoded and only a set of dials was needed.
Psychologists. however. recommended the extra weight of
a radio to allow social communications between the two.
and wages were
vas said to be
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to increase their sense of well-being and psychological
fitness. and thus their survival rate. On the one
side. efficiency in coordination is desirable. but more
versatile communication increases the system's chance
of survival.
3.1. §istQ~~£~l f~E~~ti~~
Like the scientists of physics. biology and
chemistry. economists of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries vere sure that there was a natural
order of the universe. and all they had to do was to
discover it. They were positive that it was a "system
of natural liberty." and did not have to be regulated
by government authorities.
In the vords of William Kapp (1971. p.5). "the
philosophical presuppositions of classical econo.ics
determined the selection of the phenomena to be studied
by economic science. the scope of which was thus more
and more adapted to its original (normative) aim of
demonstrating both the existence and the superiority of
the system of natural liberty over alternative forms of
econoaic organization."
Costs. profits. capital. rent
correlated and non-rational behavior
irrelevant or non-existent. Economic thought was
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dominated by a wish to prove that maximum utility
results from free competition. Social, collective
wants were not respected by the market, and vere
considered minor and exceptional disturbances.
According to Adam Smith, (Clark, 1955), the
pursuit of profit in a competitive market vould be the
incentive to produce sufficiently large quantities of
goods for pUblic consumption and reduce profits to such
a level that they would just serve as an adequate
stimulus. This was long the standard of good economic
performance.
Under the classical system, people could pursue
their own interests as long as they did not use their
persons or property to injure others. Since no
coercion was allowed, goods and services would be
exchanged on an equivalent basis. To ensure that
exchanges were eqUivalent, the system relied on
competitive behavior. Individuals had to know their
own interests, and it wa~ assumed that they would look
after those interests better than others would do on
their behalf.
The factory system multiplied, and prices on items
such as textiles dropped. The workers, however, were
given such low wages that they were worse off than
before. Karl ~arx saw poverty as inevitable under the,
profit system. Others thought that worker poverty was
bad, but saw it as the result of supply and demand, and
page 1ij
considered it to be the factory workers' ethical
obligation to reduce their own rate of increase.
3.2. ~Qst ~!ternalitie~
Since resource allocation in the competitive
market depends on prices, proper allocation will not
result where costs or benefits can not be expressed in
monetary terms and collected. For example, Lake
~ichigan is heavily laden with dangerous PCBs. These
chemicals forced the closure of com.ercial fishing in
the southern reaches, and threaten the health of all
who eat fish from the lake. However, commercial
fishermen and the tourist industry were not able to
charge those who released the chemicals for the
resulting damages.
Meighborhood effects of one participant upon
another, outside their market interaction, need not
always be detrimental. For example, municipal ocean
dumping may increase the productivity of fish stocks in
sOBe areas.
3.3,. H2w ESQnomies 2f Size Destroy Competition~
The price system will not function properly
without competition. This, in turn, requires that each
participant act as though his actions do not affect
price. Such is the behavior of farmers, most
fishermen, and the general consuming public. If there
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are economies of size in a particular industry,
however, competition will break down (Ferguson, 1978)n
All firms viII increase production because they can
thus reduce average costs, and because their individual
actions will not affect prices. Since all firms will
have the same incentive to increase production,
industry prices will decline and eventually drop below
costs. At this point losses occur and some firms vill
leave the indus~ry. As long as each firm believes that
its actions do not affect price, they viII continue to
increase production to reduce costs, thereby realize
the economies of size, and eventually, vhen production
costs are lov enough, make a profit. The same
incentive continues to apply to all firms and so they
vill continue to increase production, causing prices to
drop further, and causing additional firms to leave the
industry. Eventually, there will be so fev firms left .
that they will realize that their actions do affect
prices. A price war may then follow resulting in a
monopoly, or the oligopoly may continue.
3.4. Ba~rie~§~__EntrI~
When a sufficiently saall nuaber of firms exists
so that their actions do affect prices, the firms may
protect their position by raising barriers to entry.
Established firms that have advantages over new
entrants due to economies of scale, product
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differentiation, or absolute costs, can persistently
earn profits over competitive levels without attracting
new firms to the industry.
Firms already in the market will'try to raise the
cost of entry as high as possible, to reduce the chance
of a new entry, and to increase the probability of
failure if a new firm does enter. Barriers to entry
are most desirable when demand is fairly inelastic,
that is, when consumer demand does not change much with
price. If a change in price has little effect on the
quantity demanded, then the prevention of new
competition would enable existing firms to increase
their profit by raising prices while maintaining their
level of output.
Fishermen usually can not affect prices on an
individual basis. They are price takers. Fish are
perishable, and storage for sale · at a later date
usnally costs more than it is worth. Fish buying, in
constrast, is a more concentrated industry, with higher
barriers to entry. Therefore, fisher.en have less
market power than buyers.
Econo.ies of size are the most co••on barrier of
entry to fish buying. The .inimum optimal firm size
take up a large share of the .arket, and the capital
'r e q ni r e d to establish a firm of the optimal size may be
difficult to obtain.
While economies of size are usually based on the
differentiation aay be used as a barrier
so far as fish dealers establish
Boats may remain loyal to established
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assumption that technical knowledge remains constant
and daily output varies, learning effects are also
important. Economies of size may accrue over time with
a large cumulative outputo Basically, one can perzorm
routine operations more quickly with practice. If a
production line has been working a long time, employees
get better at working with the machines. Trade
patterns with other dealers become well established and
must not be renegotiated in full each tiae. "In the
semi-conductor industry a learning effect has been
reported in which costs may fall by 20 or 30 per cent
as (aggregate) output doubles, and in different machine
tool activities a reduction in labor costs of 16 to 25
per cent has been found as output doubles (over time),"
(Pickering, 1974, p.39).
Existing buyers and processers may have absolute
cost advantages due to special expertise and prduction
techniques, which would be costly for competitors to
obtain. Established plants with long records will also
find it easier and less expensive to obtain loans, than
new entrants will. Pinally, some firms are able to get
supplies more cheaply, either through direct control by
vertical integration, or because of favorable
agreements.
Product
to entry in
reputations.
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buyers because they always pay on time, or because they
loaned the boat money during times of need and probably
would do so again. since fish between dealers is sold
unseen, over the telephone, established dealers may
receive higher prices due to their reputation of good
fish quality and reliability.
Even when there is no difference between fish in
the retail market, firms aay create a perceptual
difference between stores through advertising.
. "' ~.
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III. PERFORMANCE OF EXISTING FISH AUCTIONS
As shown in the previous sections, the price
system is generally considered to be the best way to
allocate resources, to create production and
economization incentives, and to coordinate production
with the desires of consumers. It was also shown that
impediments to the perfect working of the price system
may exist. Economies of scale in processing,
transportation, or information collection may break
down the competition required by the price system.
Fishermen are usually paid a share of the catch value,
yet this value may be set artificially low by
vertically integrated processing firms that own their
own boats. Difficulties in fish standardization may
isolate fishermen in a detrimental way, reducing their
ability to argue when negotiating quality discounts.
The author visited the fish auctions of New
Bedford, Massachusetts; Hamburg and cuxhaven, West
Germany; Hvide Sande and Esbjerg, Denmark; Hull and
Aberdeen, in the United Kingdoa; and Ijauiden, in the
Netherlands. Observations recorded during these
visits, as vell as a series of interviews and the
available lit.erature, are used here to show how
auctions can be used to facilitate the proper and
efficient functioning of the price aechanislB. The
related question, concerning auction effects on fish
quality, will also be addressed.
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1. Illes o£_ Fish -l1ll:~illg=-
To present auctions in perspective. this section
will list the fish marketing systems in use and give
their global distributiono
Direct sales are usual in Canada. Greece. Turkey.
the u.s. and in underdeveloped countries. Commissioned
salesmen are common in Greece. Japan. and the United
Kingdom inshore-catches. In general. direct sales viII
be found where the number of buyers and the quantity of
fish are not too large (OECD. 1966).
Fishermen's cooperative societies are videspread
in Denmark. West Germany. and Sweden4
Both' Sweden and Norvay utilize fishermen's sales
organizations. In fact. in Norvay. the fishermen's
sales organization has the legal sole right to
first-hand sale. Price boards are employed in Iceland.
!os~ fish processed at sea is sold by contract.
Unless the complete product market is covered. buyers
and sellers may be reluc~an~ to sign contrac~s.
Changes in the rest of the market could put either
boats or buyers in a bad position. This is
pa~icularily hard to achieve when part of the supply
comes from i.por~s. Although Vidaeus (1911) reported
that 10~ of all frozen herring sold by the West German
trawler companies' fish sales organization was sold
under contract. this a.ounted to only 201 of that
nation's total consumption_
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Auctions are the most important first-sale system
in Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Dutch auctions, where
the price is lowered instead of raised, are used in the
Netherlands, at Hull in the U.K., in Portugal, Spain,
Belgium, and to a small extent Japan. The Japanese
also have simultaneous auctions in which all potential
buyers bid at the same moment.
2. lia:ture and A~ligbi*ity of ~ctio1!2:.
pricing systems fall into three general
categories: fixed prices, price determination by
private treaty, and competitive price determination.
Fixed prices are the most widespread system in
modern economies. Although they change over time,
prices in stores are fixed in the short run. There,
one can only choose between buying an item or not
buying it. Fishermen's cooperatives either buy fish at
fixed prices, or charge a fixed amount per pound for
handling..
Price determination by private treaty is
characteristically used by middlemen. This system
allows maxi.u. flexibility, but has high costs in terms
of time and information required. Fishermen may be in '
a very poor position if they act competitively and
independently when buyers do not.
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In an auction, sellers may register a minimum
price, below which they will not sell, but otherwise
they have a passive role, leaving the actual selling to
the auctioneer. As each lo~ is sold, the owner
temporarily assumes a monopolistic role and relies on
competition among buyers to determine the price4
Usually, to maintain actual and perceived honesty, the
auctioneer is purely an outside agent who neither buys
nor sells any goods for himself4
Although the Bri~ish in Hong Kong and other
governments have introduced them as part of a market
reform (Cassady, 1976), auctions have several
limitations.•
For example, potential competition must already
exist4 Auctions can be used to break certain barriers
to entry, but they will not create new competition
where there was no potential. Competition must not
only exist at the first level of buyers, but must
extend all the way through to the consumer4 A free and
highly competitive auction at the first level does
little good if all the fish ends up with a monopolistic
processer at another level-
The best way to assure free competiton at an
auction is to attract as many buyers as possible so
that coordination problems will make collusion
difficult. Conditions of entry should be made as easy
as posible, not only to allow access to buyers in
the
The
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numbers, but to allow entry to buyers of different
sizes and thus different cost structures. If grades
and standards can be sUfficiently defined and enforced,
a teletype auction would open access to buyers in
remote locations.
A second major limitation to auctions is that they
require a substantial minimum value of sales to attract
a sufficient number of buyers for competition and to
carry overhead costs.
Auctions do not necessarily result in optimal
resource allocation. Where bargaining, blocking, and
recontracting take place, there will be no sUb-optimal
allocation in the Pareto sense. In other words, there
vill exist no alternative state in which one
participant would benefit, vithout requiring some loss
on the part of another. Traders vill recontract until
neither side can improve their position.. No such
recontracting rules exist in auctioning. Not only do
mistakes in allocation occur, but they cannot be
corrected. It may be possible to recontract outside of
the auction and that often ha ppens.. Por example,
offshore oil leases bought at auctions are often resold
privately (Amihud, 1976). "Pinhookers" buy lots of
tobacco in early rounds of auctioning and resell them
right on the floor of the auction later on.
pinally, auctions usually do not satisfy
requirements for path independence or neutrality.
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competitive allocating rule is neutral in itself, but
the result of auctions depend on the sequence of goods
to be sold. An exception to this of course is the New
Bedford auction, where all lots are sold
simultaneously.
In favor of auctions, is the fact that they are
fast and inexpensive. They have often been justified
on these grounds alone. When a port has many buyers
and sellers, it is much faster to sell fish at an
auction than it is to negotiate each lot over the
telephone, shopping comparatively among many different
sources. Auctions require minimal involvement on the
part of the sellers. In Denmark, where fish auctions
are very well developed, sellers usually do not even
bother to attend the auction. Buyers also benefit, in
that they get a maximum opportunity to see what is
available on the market, ' wi t h very little effort on
their part.
Time limits, within which goods must be sold, are
easily accomodated by selling through auctions.
Although time limits are particularily important in the
settling of estates, at the New Bedford fish auction
they allow sellers to see the results quickly and limit
the time crews aust wait before knowing which buyer to
take the boat to.
Auctions are
detecting device.
especially
The value
useful as a value
of fish is frequently
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unknown. It is highly perishable, and the amount
landed varies from day to day. Furthermore, quality
has not been standardized and its evaluation is
frequently subjective. Since prices that will clear
the market change from day to day, and since there is a
great variability in quality between lots, auctions are
very well suited to the sale of fish.
The standardization of fish quality would aid
buyers at auctions in their appraisal of what lots are
worth, and is required for the European Econimic
Community's program of price minimums. The
standardization of hogs has progressed to a level
allowing remote buyers to bid electronically at the
Ontario Hog Producers Karketing Board auction.
However, while extensive quality standardization would
make auctions accessible to more buyers by not
requiring the physical presence of a representative,
the degree of standardization required for this usually
results in contract selling. Where the value of an
object is known, the motivation to use an auction is
not as great. Auctions are not employed in Iceland
because fish there is primarily canned or frozen, and
thus becomes a standard stable-price ite.. In Ontario,
all hogs sold to packers must go through the Bog
Producers ~arketing Board by law, giving it a legally
enforcable selling aonopoly_
Fluctuations in quantities of fish to be handled
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are more easily accomodated by auctions than by
middlemen or cooperatives. The later two usually store
and handle the fish more than auctions dOa Thus an
increase in quantity would require an increase in
facilities. Cooperatives have been known to refuse new
members, believing that the number of boats and
quantities of fish would stabilize below current
levels, and believing that new facilities required to
accomodate new me.bers would soon become obsolete.
Auction halls, on the other hand, are typically under
utilized4 Fish are unloaded, weighed, boxed and placed
in the halls in the early morning, sales are completed
within a few hours, and then the halls lay empty for
most of the day. capacity could easily be doubled by
holding two auctions a day instead of one. The rate of
sales in each hall can be increased by employing
several auctioneers and holding several auctions
simultaneously in the same hall, a common practice in
Europe~ It is also common in Europe for fish still to
be unloaded and placed in one part of the auction hall,
while auctions are progress~ng in a second part and
fork-lifts have already removed sold fish from a third
part4 Increasing auction capacity involves very little
risk since no new facilities are required. If volume
increases turn out to be only temporary, the additional
personnel can be laid off.
Auctions can be used as a mechanism to bring about
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market centralization. This is facilitated where
product standards are well defined and enforced, so'
that neither goods nor buyers need be physically
assembled at one point. currently, when fishermen
loyally sell to one buyer in exchange for the guarantee
that they will always have a market for their fish,
middlemen must equalize fluctuations of supply by
selling back and forth among themselves. Fish are
often unnecessarily shipped hundreds of miles, only to
be shipped right back to a neighboring dealer. This
excess transportation is costly and reduces fish
quality. Not only would this be corrected by market
centralization, but competition would be improved as
well.
The last major use of auctions is to remove
suspicions of collusion between owners and buyers.
Crews vork on a share basis, and they want to prevent
the owners from publicly selling at a low price, and
privately getting a kick-back. Where boats are owned
by vertically integrated fir.s, crew members are in a
particularily weak position.. Some trawler companies
sell at auctions, even though they process fish, so
that the crew share is not a matter of internal
accounting, but publicly displayed.
3. Auctiqn. RUles~
The rules of an auction determine its outcom~
page 28
The rules curren~ly used in fish auctions of northern
Europe and the U. 54 are given below.
3.1.1. R~Bmark, The gn~ted Kingdo!£
snd ~est~~~
The rules described in this section are employed
by all the fish auctions of the United Kingdom except
in Hull, and all those in Denmark and West Germany.
They are suitable for auctions of unlimited size.
Fish from the same boat, of the same species,
size, and quality are grouped into blocks and displayed
on the auction floor~ The fish have been weighed by
auction personnel so that all boxes contain a standard
weight. Fish are placed on the floor in the same order
they are unloaded, which is the reverse order of their
capture.. Therefore quality gradations usually exist
froa one side of the block to the other..
The blocks are divisible, the buyer only being
required to buy one box of fish in the case of large
blocks, or one fish from very slBal~ blocks. The
mini.um allowable purchase is specified before the
bidding on each lot begins. sometimes a maxi.um
allowable purchase less than the entire block is also
specified..
Sellers may register a minimum price with the
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auctioneer, below which they will not sell.
All participants may bid on all blocks.
The blocks are sold successively.
All bids are pUblic in the sense that the ~ntent
of gestures with hands, eyes or head is easily
understood, although the gesture itself may be subtle-
secret signals and book bids are not used.
Bids are made successively.
The bidding starts at a low price and is
progressively upwards.
!aking the highest bid for a block requires the
bidder to buy at least the minimum, and usually gives
hi. the option of buying the entire block. He may walk
about the boxes and choose to buy as many as he wants,
in any randoll order or pattern.. Slips of paper bearing
the companies symbol are placed in the claimed boxes to
distinguish them. If a buyer accidentally . marks aore
or less boxes than he said he would buy, he is held to
what he said, which is recorded in the auctioneer's
books.
If the highest bidder does not buy the entire
block, other buyers may yell out the number of boxes
they want to buy at the same price. This may continue
until the entire block has been claimed.
If the entire lot is not sold at the highest bid,
the auctioneer drops the price unitl he gets a
response, and the bidding starts over again for the
remaining block.
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The second bidding may exceed the
price paid for the first lot. Again. other buyers may
claim remaining boxes. paying the same price as the
winner of the second round of bidding. The auctioneer
restarts the bidding until the entire block has been
sold.
So that some processers can start work on the fish
earlier. up to 25% of a boat·s catch may be taken in
advance to buyers in West Ger.any and the United
Kingdom. The price is determined by what auction
prices are for that day. and buyers at the auction know
how .uch vas taken.
In the fresh herring industries of the U. K••
Belgium. and ~o a small extent in the Netherlands.
buyers bid on samples. not the entire catch~ This cuts
down the facilities needed. and since the fish go
directly from the
not spoil while
boat to processing plants. they do
sitting exposed in the auction hall.
Of course. the ca~ch must be homogenous in terms of
species. size. and quality.
Although frozen fish is often sold by contrac~ and
goes directly to buyers. it is also sold at auction in
West Germany. It is stored in auction freezers and
buyers bid on the basis of samples.
3.1.2. New __Bedford~
Two auctions take place in the auction hall of New
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Bedford each day. one for fish and one for shellfish.
On a typical day. between five and ten boats land fish.
The captain's estimates of weight for their
various fish species and size classes are posted below
the boat's name on a blackboard. The fish remain in
the boat until after they are sold. The price is
determined on a per-pound basis. No discounts for poor
quality are negotiated. A buyer must rely purely on
the boat's reputation and his past experience to know
what kind of fish quality and actual weights to expect-
A buyer must bUy an entire boat at a time. Two or
three aain buyers do most of the bidding. and they
negotiate with secondary buyers during the bidding to
sell portions of the boat they do not want. A .uch
used telephone bank in the auction hall allows buyers
to contact distant dealers during the bidding. to
negotiate further sales.
The first phase of bidding lasts fifteen minute~
Buyers yell out what they wish to pay per pound for
each of the categories of fish listed below a boat's
name. The price is written next to each category. and
the buyer's intials or symbol is written at the bottom.
A second buyer. wishing to take the boat away from the
first. may not drop the price for any category. To get
the boat he must raise the price per pound for any
category of the boat's fish. The price rise affects
only that specific boat; the price for the same fish on
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other boats remains unchanged. The new price replaces
the previous one on the blackboard. and the new owner's
symbol is written at the bottom. This continues for
fifteen minutes until a bell is rung.
The boat owners then have two minutes to look at
the prices and may decide to withdraw their catch from
the auc~ion. This is their last chance to withdraw
frOB the auction.
Finally. buyers are allowed a second period of
bidding. lasting only five minutes. This allows
bidders whose boats have withdrawn to make adjustments.
It is less expensive to gain control of a boat by
raising the price per pound on a small quantity of fish
than on a large quantity. Therefore price quotations
for species landed in small volumes typically exceed
what buyers would pay if the species were sold
separately. and prices for abundant species are
correspondingly too low.
3.1.3. ~oston~
The New England Fish Exchange runs the auc~ion at
Boston. A small fleet charaterized by long fishing
trips lands there. so there are usually only a few
boats landing their catch each day. The system in use
would obviously be incapable of handling large
landings.
Fish stay in the boat and are no~ seen by the
page 33
buyers until after the auction. They are sold "as if
first quality", allowing quality discounts to be
negotiated later. Buyers must rely pn the boat's
reputation and their own past experience to know what
they are bidding on. Weight estimates by the captains
for the various species and size classes are written on
a board.
The fish from all boats are sold together by
species and size class. The auctioneers quote a price
per pound, and buyers make offers to buy certain
weights from whatever boat they wish to specify. The
first to make an offer on a boat gets the first fish
off-loaded. These are the last caught and of the best
quality. The last to bid get the bottom fish. The
auctioneers add up a~l the offers to buy and keep
raising the price until the market clears.
A boat may reserve a portion of its catch for a
prearranged buyer who has agreed to pay the resulting
auction price. The weight reserved is made publica
As mentioned before, all bids are made as if fish
were first quality. If the buyer believes that the
fish he receives is not first quality, he may try to
negotiate a discount with the captain. Here prices are
no longer formed by the impersonal force of buyer
competition, but are affected by personah market power.
Auction personnel will attempt to arbitrate the dispute
if necessary. If the discount dispute can not be
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with the winning bidder required to make a minimum
purchase, and having the option of buying the entire
block or any portion of it. The price is raised and
the process starts anew for any remaining portions.
Simultaneous bids by two or more buyers under the
Dutch system are somewhat troubleso.e, relying on the
auctioneer's discretion in determining who vas actually
the first bidder. This ambiguity of winner does not
make Buch difference where many si.ilar lots are sold
in one day, as in the case of fish auctions. The
looser of the first lot Bay resolve to bid just a
little earlier next time. The auctioneer's judgement,
however, could become an important issue in the sale of
unique and valuable objects, such as works of art.
Under the English system, when the auctioneer
recognizes one of two apparently simultaneous bids, the
losing bidder has the opportunity to raise his bid.
The English system seems to be the most
appropriate when the Yalues are sUbjective, as in the
case of art, antiques, unique objects, and collector
items such as coins. Ascending bids allow potential
buyers to become involved in a personal, non-rational,
basis. By having made several bids which were later
exceeded, bidders may feel a psychological investment
they are unwilling to lose_ Or they may find themselves
caught up in the competitive spirit, and be persuaded
by the auctioneer to bid above what they had set as
. lIo" . ~
.....
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their ceiling price. This is aost likely when buyers
base their appraisal. in part. on what other bidders
seem to think an object is worth.
Dutch auctions. on the other hand. are mechanical
by nature. They do not lend themselves to changing the
bidder's appraisal of value. Where lots are numerous
and fairly similar. Dutch auctions Bay be more
appropriate in that they seem to be faster. Under
these conditions. buyers are more apt to have definite
ideas on each lot's value and are less likely to be
swayed by a prolonged process. In the case of fish.
other sources of supply are available and professional
buyers will not use an auction if it takes too long.
The auctioneer. under the English system~ has
considerable discretion as to when he closes biddingG
Under the Dutch system. auctioneers Bay introduce a
bias in recognizing
simultaneous bids.
one out of two apparently
All personal influence on the part
of the auctioneer is removed when the Dutch auction is
done electronically.
3.•2.2. Electi:onic_g~k ftethQd,.
Dutch auctions by electronic clock are possible on
several levels of sophistication.
Traditionally. buyers inspect lots. ¥rite down
their impressions. and then assemble in the clock roo..
Such a room may have fifty or Bore small desks arranged
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in tiers so that all have a clear view of the large
clock at the front of the room. At the Ijauiden fish
auction, the outside edge of th$ clock is marked off in
hundredths of guilders. The price in whole guilders
and the buyer number are displayed electronically in
the middle of the clock.
Buyers sit with their palms down on the desks, and
their thumbs resting against the stop-button underneath
the desk. This way no one can see when a buyer is
about to bid, and bid just before him.
The lot number is announced, and in the case of
vegetable, fruit, and flower auctions, a sample may be
shown and described. The clock hand begins its
counter-clockwise sweeping motion, dropping the price
in hundredth guilder increments. The sale is completed
when the first buyer presses his button. His buyer
number will app~ar on the clock and the price is
visible to all. Due to the speed of electronics, two
buyers can not bid at the same moment.
At the time the Ijmuiden auction was visited, in
January 1980, three auctions were usually held
simultaneously: one in the clock room and two in the
fish hall. (the three together sold over ten thousand
boxes of fish per hour). At the time, the clock room
was only used for high-value species such as sole and
turbot. Other species were thought not to be
sufficiently uniform, and buyers wanted to view them
.--- - --- - - - - - - - - - - ---- - -_.....----------------
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while bidding. The Ijmuiden auction was planning to
buy clocks that could be wheeled around among the boxes
in the fish hall. Buyers would have remote stopping
devices and the problem of detecting the first bid from
thirty or forty crowding and pushing buyers would be
alleviated. At that time detection was difficult. The
auctioneer concantrated on the price while another
employee watched for bids.
Although no fin-fish auction has reached this
level of sophistication. the ontario Hog Producers
"arketing Board runs a Dutch clock auction by teletype.
Buyers bid from terminals in their own office and the
hogs are assembled at about twenty locations throughout
the province. The buyers are informed over the
teletype of the hogs' location. numbers. weight and
sex. prescribed quality discounts are recorded once
the hogs have been slaughtered. prices are dropped via
the teletype. and pushing a button on the terminal will
stop the clock. Although farmers may not reject sales.
the ftarketing Board e.ploys minimum prices by stopping
the clock. and may withhold hogs from sale for a day or
two.
3,.3. ~aJ2~DeSe 51111\1tan~us Bi,d .system:.
A type of fish auction prevalent in Japan requires
that all interested buyers bid at the same time. Bids
consist of hand signs that denote specific monetary
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start with r the auctioneer requests whispered bids.
They claim it is faster. It is possible that buyers
would be hesitant about bidding for such odd lots
during reqular auctioninqr due to group preasure4 A
hiqher price may be achieved when bids remain
confidential and the buyer is not exposed to ridicule
by his colleagues4 Although the auctioneer announces
the buyer r he does not state the price.
4. ~_~~gqence Q~ales~
The order in which lots are sold at auction r
affects not only the prices received on the particular
lots. but also affects both the number of lots sold and
the total value of auction sales.
pishermen can take advantaqe of the common
prac~ice that the first fish landed is the first to be
sold4 Buyers are willing to pay a slight premium on
these lots so that the processers they represent can
begin work as early in the day as possible.
The first phase of each auction is also marked by
price fluctuations until the market performance
establishes itself.
Sosnick (1963) warns buyers against price
discrimination at auctions. Buyers are tempted into
price discri.ination in proportion to their eagerness
to buy. Theoretically. he claims r the .ost eaqer to
buy viII vin the first lot at a price higher than the
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following lots. Each successively most eager to buy
will bUy· at successively decreasing prices. Four
factors. however. may explain vhy the predicted
downtrends are only rarely observed.
') The first downtrend can be
interupted by another one. Buyers may
change; late-comers may enter. and
buyers who have left to walk around may
come back.
2) Quality variations between lots aay
mask the downtrends.
3) Buyers may not have a fira idea of
what they can resell the lots for later.
or what is available to them in
alternative aarkets. If their
perception of market prices rises during
the course of the auction. this will
upset a downtrend.
4) Buyers may change their behavior
during the auction. bidding less when
competing with friends and bidding aore
when in competition with strangers.
As the auction progresses. buyers use up their
resources. whether it be storage space. Boney, or the
quantity that they can resell. A buyer must decide
whether to bUy less preferred objects in the beginning,
and thus be forced to pass up more preferred objects
. ... .-..~.~..
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that vill be sold later. Yet there is no assurance
that he will not be out-bid on later objects if he
waits for them. If the auctioneer places goods with
high reserve Yal~es, below which the sellers refuse to
trade, for sale first, he can be sure of strong
bidding. This will, however, use up resources as the
auction progresses, leaving less for later goods.
The order in vhich goods are sold directly affects
the auctioneer's earnings. Schotter (Amihud, 1916)
studied the Bohm-Bawerk horse auction. He found that
if horses with the highest reserve values vere
auctioned last, then the number of horses sold would
not differ from ~he control group of randomly .~xed
horses, but that final prices vould be higher. On the
other hand, if the horses with the highest reserve
values were sold first, then the last horses would sell
for less than thei would have in the control group, but
more horses would have been sold. If the auctioneer
was a profit maximizer, and if he was paid a percentage
of sales, then he would sell the horses with the
highest reserve values last. If he. instead, was paid
a flat rate per horse, then he would sell those with
high reserve value first. In this second case his
interest would conflict with that of . the sellers',
which is to get the most for each horse.
5.• Lot Size~
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Allowing blocks to be broken frees the buyer of a
certain amount of risk. If he recognizes that he has
let himself bid too high, he only has to buy the
·minimum. A minimum required purchase on the part of
the high bidder is necessary for the bidding to be
meaningful. Setting a high minimum would speed sales,
bay would deny access to small buyers. At the very
least, it would require saall buyers to form a
coalition and purchase jointly. Auction price
determination, however, relies on free competition by
as many participants as possible.
The auction at Hamburg, West Germany, aakes a
special effort to accomodate small buyers. The city of
Hamburg, in an attempt to help its fish retailers,
guarantees minimum prices above those of the European
Commanity to draw boats that would otherwise not steam
the eight hours ap the Elbe River. The boats would
sellon the Cuxhaven auction, at the mouth of the Elbe,
instead.
!ost auctions only sell in 50 kilogram boxes.
While the Hamburg auction uses 50 kilogram (111 u. s.
lb.) boxes for some species, flatfish are sold in
special 40 kilogram (88 (J.• s, lb..) and 15 kilogram (33
u. s. lb.) boxes for small shops and restaurants.
!ost auctions do not set maximum purchse limits,
allowing an entire block of fish to be purchased at
once. Due to the comparatively small amoant of fish
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landed there, (6,990 metric tons compared to 78,140 at
Cuxhaven in 1977), Hamburg does set a maximum lot size.
Breaking the block up, and thus increasing the number
of sales, has the advantage of increasing the chances
of arriving at the highest possible price (Goben,
1964). It also prevents a buyer from buying the entire
block and then controling the market. In order to bUy
his supplies, in the absence of maximum purchase
li.its, a small Hamburg buyer would have to practice
price discrimination against himself,. He vould have to
pay a premium to make sure he vas one of the first high
bidders, before a large buyer won and bought the
remaining block~
6 ,. Strategi~
6. 1'. ~ill~s at. AgW.Q!l2.:.
sellers have fairly few strategic options
available to them under auction rules, and are, as a
rule, fairly passive. Vernon Smith (1964) showed that
this relative lack of seller involvement did not
necessarily hurt them, and could even be to their
advantage.
In gaming experiments, Vernon Smith sold goods
under the following three rules.
I' only sellers .ade offers; buyers
could only accept or refuse.
page 45
12 Both buyers and sellers could make
offers. could make counter offers. and
could accept or refuse them4
.3 Only buyers made offers; sellers
could only accept or refuse the ••
The highest. equilibrium prices resulted under the third
set of rules. where sellers only accepted or refused
offers. If sellers remain silent. or passively accept
tendered offers. t.hen competitive preasure will reveal
more information on the buyers' willingness to buy.
The sellers do not disclose anything about their
reservation price. which would eventually co.e t.o light
under competition. and they can thus sell above the
theoretical equilibriu••
6.1. 1. ~llL..fn~
A widely used strategy on the part of sellers is
to reqister a minimum price with the auctioneer before
the start of bidding. On an individual basis. they are
meaningless unless the fisher.an is convinced that he
could get at least his mini.um price by selling on
another .arket or by storing his fish until prices
improve. If no available market will give hi. a high
price. and if storing the fish is costly or impossible.
then he does not gain by sett.ing "a high reserve price.
Although resources may be allocated optimally
where prices accurately reflect supply and demand. most
...... -.
have minimum prices and equaliza~ion
haddock before ~he European Economic
introduced its own sys~e.. The money
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firms a~~emp~ ~o avoid ~he risk that price fluc~uations
caase_ cooperatives offer more stable prices than
auctions in that they may sell at an auction when
prices are high, and also . typically have storage
facili~ies for periods of low demand_ Furthermore,
cooperatives may deal wi~h buyers from a large
geographical region, and their prices are no~
intima~ely linked to the performance of one particular
market_ Thus, in the early seventies, before there
were minimum prices on herring, Denmark experienced a
movement away from aac~ions in favor of cooperatives
and their s~able prices (Sorrig. Brabrand)_ Herring
boats would return after fourteen days at sea only to
find tha~ ~he market had jUs~ been flooded and tha~
their fish was worthless. There is a time lag in ~he
ability of fishing boats ~o reac~ ~o marke~ prices. In
the shor~-run the supply is fixed; ~he fish already
caught mus~ be sold_ The longer ~he ~ime be~ween when
fishermen las~ heard market prices, and when they can
market ~heir fish, ~he greater ~he risk. Even if
fishermen re~urn before ~hey have caugh~ any fish, due
to low price repor~s over the radio, they are s~ill
left with high cos~s when the fishing grounds are
dis~ant4
Denmark did
for plaice and
Community (EEe)
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for this came from the fishermen themselvesq All that
sold those tvo species above the established minimum
had to pay a certain amount for each kilogramo In this
way, market risk was leveled out. among the bca t a, The
actual establishment of price minimums, and the
administration of the entire system, was carried out by
the producer organizations. The Minister of Pisheries,
however, had formal control. A board, set up in the
Ministry of Pisheries, formally set. price minimums and
the producer organizations asked this board to change
the. whenever needed.
A sys~em of minimum prices vithout equalization
gives vertically integrated firms, which wholesale or
process fish, a definite advantage. Before the British
introduced equalization funds in 1954, large firms
would buy their own fish and sell it at a slight loss
rather than get the fishmeal price. Unintegrated
firms, which could not buy their fish back and channel
it to other markets, were at a disadvanta this and had
to take fishmeal prices in times of market glu~
(Taylor, 1960).
Two problems arise vith price minimums. Pirst,
there is the problem of administration. One mus~ find
a way so tha~ boats do not sell below the minimum price
publicly, receive more aoney privately, and get
minimum-price money. Ironically, although auc~ion
price fluctuations may create the need for a system of
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miniaums. auctions also facilitate their
administration. Abusing price minimums through
artificially lov prices and kick· backs at auctions is
difficult because sales are pUblic and a specific buyer
is not assured.
secondly. a system of price minimums must be
accompanied by a good system of fish grading. Without
fish grading. there would be no incentive for boats to
produce quality fish. They could bring partially
spoiled fish to the lIarket and still collect the
mini mUll price.
ander the old German system. there was just one
minimull price. with such a system • .the strategy was to
just produce a B (good) quality fish. Even though it
would not be sold at the auction and be turned into
fishmeal. the boat would get the guaranteed minimum.
The EEC now operates a minimum price systea for
all lIember countries. which is administered locally
through producer organizations. Quality ratings are
standardized and there are four classifications:
E extra prime quality. This is the last
caught fish which remains on deck in
cool weather. or fish caught on
longlines.
A very good fish.
B good fish.
C taken off the market and processed into
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fishmeal and oi14
Separate minimum prices are guaranteed for categories E
through B. Although the grading is done
organoleptically, it is done by specially trained
veterinarians. If large quantities of fish are rated
at a quality that the captain does not agree with, the
fish are withdrawn from sale, and laboratory tests are
performed which are completed the same day.
The iaplementation of individual reserve prices is
allowed under the EEC's system but seldom carried out.
Even though the minimum prices paid by the EEC are so
low that no boat could survive totally on them,
fishermen would rather settle for them than store or
transport their already unloaded fish. Rather than set
reserve prices of their own, they accept occasional low
prices. They react to persistant low prices by landing
in different ports, fishing less or fishing for other
species, and trying to raise the EEC's ainimua prices
through political participation in producer
organizations.
6.1 .. 2.. W;thg,rawal 2.t-~Qods and Buyin9' One's Own.:,
The withdrawal of goods and buying one's own goods
are best used to protect oneself fro. unsuspected price
drops. They are hind-sighted methods, and protection
against suspected low prices is afforded through the
use of reserve prices-
page 50
In New Bedford. the withdrawal of goods plays an
important role because the use of reserve prices is
more difficult there. As noted in chapter III. section
3.1~2_. control of the boat can be gained by increasing
the bid on the species with the least amount of fishu
since the whole boat is sold to one buyer. prices on
each species need not reflect market value. Thus a
reserve price by species can not be used. A reserve
price could be set for the whole boat by multiplying
the reserve price for each fish class by the estimated
weight and adding thea all together. But this involves
more math than fishermen may be interested in. and the
captains may not be that sure of themselves when
selecting minimum prices in the first place. Not much
market information is available to New England
fishermen. and much of what is. is based on prices in
New Bedford. It may be easier just to see how the
auction goes. see if they get about the same as the
other boats. and decide afterwards.
The withdrawal of goods after the bidding is most
useful for unique objects where the value is really not
known to the seller. and he must rely in part on his
intuitive feelings during the auction to decide if the
competition was the best he can expect~ As fish
quality standards becoae more defined. and as fish
value becomes more apparent. the withdrawal of goods is
discouraged in favor of reserve prices. due to time
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considerationsa
Bidding on one's own goods is also most useful for
sales of unique objects. The purpose here is to
stimulate competition by becoming a competitor oneself.
Buying one's own goods is only a last resort, required
only when one did not have the foresight to set a
reserve price or make provisions for withdrawal. The
disadvantage of it is that one mast pay the
auctioneer's fee to get one's own goods back.
6.2. ~YI~rs at lqctio~
While sellers all try to get the most for their
goods, buyers at auctions aay have two different goals.
Pirst, buyers may be interested in percentage
buying_ They may wish to buy a specified percentage of
the goods up for sale, while keeping the average price
of their purchase below a certain limit. Only a few
oligopolists attempt this. They try to .aintain a
specified market share, and prevent competitors from
buying less expensiye supplies. Buyers of tobaccos
work under such percentage instructions.
!ore commonly, buyers try to maximize monetary
gain. In yiew of his other contracts, a buyer knows
how much a lot will be worth to hi. at the end of the
auction. He trys to enlarge the difference between
what he pays and what the lot will be worth to him
later. This includes buyers who supply processing
page 52
plants, and who attempt to provide a steady volume in
light of the costs of shutting down and restarting
production lines~
It is not necessary for every firm to have their
own buyer at the auction, although most firms like to
have this. At Hvide Sande, Denmark, only five to seven
buyers usually at~end the auction. Some of the.
represented three or four smaller firms that could not
afford a buyer of their own. The buyers there were
paid a flat rate per box purchased.
6.2.1. COl!g§!2u--snd ~~ice Leadershie,
Studying livestock auctions, Sosnick (1963) vas
interested in whether a person could bid
monopsonistically at auctions~ In other words, could a
buyer "take advantag~ of knoving that the quantity he
bUyS vill affect his average costs"? sosnick concluded
that this was not possible in practice due to the
amount of information which vas required, and due to
the lack of time during the auction to .ake the
complicated calculations.
Buyer collusion is more likely and does occur.
Three types are possible~ Buyers may rotate purchases,
they may agree no't to exceed an upper limit, or they
may practice price leadership.
Buyers have two counterbalancing motives.. First,
each wants to maximize joint profits of the industry as
- ~ ... .
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a whole, and thas increase the profits on his share.
Yet, each also would like to pay fishermen higher
prices, thus decreasing joint profits but increasing
his market share.
All buyers will try to maximize joint profits if
1) they are few enough in number to
recognize interdependence;
2) they have equal shares of the market;
3) they have the same cost structures
and thus the same output levels which
are .os~ profitable; and if
4) any change in either outpu~ or price
would draw immediate response fro.
rivals, so that there would be neither
long nor short-term gain (Bain, 1968).
Organizers of an auction should thus make entry as free
as possible because coordination between numerous
buyers is more difficult than among a few. Secondly.
an at~empt should be made to attract buyers with many
different cost structures. This will make it difficult
for them to agree on a mos~ profitable price.
Although an auction should not be organized if
there does no~ appear to be sufficient potential
compe~ition, sellers may bring collusive buyers to
court under the Sherman lnti-Trust lct. In U_s. v. San
Pedro Fish Exchange (1941) and u.S. v. Seattle Fish
Exchange (1942), the following activities were held to
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be illegal:
1)participation in any way in the
"raising, lowering, fixing, maintaining
or stabilizing" of fish prices;
2) allocating or dividing fish "whether
on a basis of groups or classes of
buyers or sellers, on the basis of
individual buyers or sellers, on any
geographical basis, or otherwise".
3) agreeing before bidding "to permit
any competitor to have the benefit of,
or to divide with, or to give to any
competitor any portion of such lot of
fish, or trip, or otherwise to engage in
the practice known as "splitting trips"
among dealers or competitors before
purchasing fish from fishermen";
4) "disclosing, disseminating, or
circulating to any competitor the
prospective bid of any dealer for any
trip or lot of fish";
5) participating in any agreement
"whereby uniform or differential prices
are agreed upon or maintained for the
respective products of different
members, principals or dealers"; and
6) "making bids
common agent".
... through or by a
6.2.2. ~§~§oqal .an~sychological Strategi~§~
Buyers develop their own distinctive style of
bidding. In observed ascending-bid fish auctions, the
auctioneer starts by raising the price and watching for
eyesignals and nods from the buyers. If supplies are
limited and buyers want to be sure they are seen, they
may switch over to raising a hand.
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A verbal bid has precedence over physical signal-
Buyers verbally raise the price as often as the
.. -~,.
auctioneer does. There is an aspect of personal
dominance in this. as well as an attempt to hurry the
auction along. Buyers may raise the price considerably
over the next increment to shake his competitors
psychologically. It can be used as a signal that the
buyer really wants the lot and that other buyers should
quit vasting their time bidding for it. because they
viII not get it anyway. A few well knovn art buyers
bid at auctions themselves. rather than use
representatives. to affect the same dominance and
intiaidation.
An alternative strategy is to bid vith marked lack
of interest. Buyers frequently do not have fixed ideas
on how much an object is worth. and rely in part on
what other bidders seem to think. Most well known art
dealers and collectors thus do not bid themselves.
Their involve.ent would alert others to the value of
the object.
6.2.3~ ~£~et Bigging sign~!§~
cassady (1961. p.150) gives several explanations
for the use of secret bidding signs. They are used:
1) to avoid the noise and confusion
resulting fro. audible bidding.
especially when numerous spirited
bidders are present;
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2) to provide a more accurate way of
communicating bids;
3) to prevent private collectors from
following the lead of knowledgeable
dealers who thus may be forced to pay
higher prices and might even lose out in
the bidding;
4) to protect buyers
low-quality item frOB
colleagues;
who bid on a
the ridicule of
5) to prevent dealers fro. detecting the
interest of competitors and thus forcing
the. to pay higher prices than might
otherwise be necessary;
6) to protect a professional who
overbids on an item from loss of face
with rival bidders;
7) to hold confidential the actions of
traders who want to keep their business
to themselves; and
8) to prevent detection of a dealers
interest in what appears to be a "find",
so that he will not lose his advantage.
secret bids at fish auctions usually consist of
signs that are very subtle and thus hard to detect, but
whose intent is clear when they are seen. They are
usually restricted to eye movements or nods of the
head. The most complicated one reported by auctioneers
who were interviewed was at the descending-bid auction
in Ijauiden, Netherlands. There, a particular buyer
kept tapping his nose, and bid when he stopped.
Complicated secret bidding signs are rare at fish
auctions since many similar lots of fish are sold at
each auction, and thus the outcome of each sale is not
that important. Complicated signals are difficult for
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the auctioneer to remember and he may become confused.
That was the case in the 1965 sale of Rembrandt's
"Titus". The preauction agreement stipulated that if
""r. Simon is sitting down, he is bidding. If he bids
openly, he is also bidding. When he stands up, he has
stopped bidding. If he sits down again, he is not
bidding unless he raises his finger. Having raised his
finger, he is bidding, until he stands up again"
(Cassady, 1967, p~151). The auctioneer got confused
and awarded the painting to the wrong person before
being challenged by Kr. Simon, who in fact had still
been bidding.
Cassady (1967) also tells of the time when a
bidder had specified that he would be bidding while his
coat was unbuttoned, and not bidding when the coat was
buttoned. He left during the bidding with an
unbuttoned coat, to be awarded an antique at a price he
did not want. The arguement then ensued, whether an
unbuttoned coat outside the auction hall was the same
as one inside.
6.2.4..~ Bids.
Book bids are not commonly used in the fish
industry since most buyers prefer to inspect the fish
themselves, and are thus in the auction hall anyway,.
They would be most useful where unlanded fish is sold
or where the goods can be exactly specified. They
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might be useful in New Bedford and Boston as fish sold
there is bought without the buyer's prior inspection.
One hundred, live, one-and-a-half pound lobsters, is an
example of a lot that need not be inspected.
In the ascending-bid system, the auctioneer bids
for the book buyer in the same increment as the
previous bid until the book bidder wins or until the
bidding exceeds the book bid. In the case of several
book bids, the auctioneer starts one interval above the
second highest book bid and then looks to the floor for
higher bids.
Since the auctioneer may use the book bids to
liven up the pace of bidding, throwing one in at any
time he chooses, the book bidder is at a disadvantage.
He may end up paying more than he would have if he had
been present, bidding sluggishly to show little
interest..
7.. 1. ~~~_ of .~omEet~tive Biddin~
Proponents of auctions, such as Wilson (1979),
claim that auctions would improve fish quality, by
allowing quality differentials paid by the consumer to
be reflected back to the producez, The current strong
interdependence and loyalties between buyers and
fishermen are thought to prevent buyers from exerting
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sufficient preasure on fishermen to raise fish quality.
It is thought that the ability of fishermen to co.pare
prices at auc~ions and see premiums being paid for top
quality, would motiYa~e them to take better care of
their catch.
This is the case for fish that will be sold to the
altimate consumer fresh and whole (gutted but not
fille~ed). Auc~ioneers were always eager to show the
author ~heir sales books, pointing out high prices paid
to boats with top quality fish. Swedes, landing fish
in Skagen, Denmark, always receive higher prices than
the Danes, due to the extra care they take of their
fish (Sorrig, Brabrand). To conserve stocks, Swedish
fishermen made a voluntary agreement to li.it their
fishing to a certain number of boxes per man per week.
To raise the total allowable catch per boat, thus
increasing returns to the boat and decreasing the fixed
costs per fisherman, they pat more crew .embers on
board. This extra crew has the time to treat the fish
properly.
Althoagh the auctioneers and the buyers may be
aware of quality premiu.s, and the fact that some boats
always get higher prices, this does not mean that
fishermen will change their behavior. Prices may be
likely to fluctuate more due to changes in supply than
due to quality differences. Fishermen, as a result,
aay concentrate on quantities being landed by others
--~~~~~~~-
page 60
and pay little attention to quality differences.
Auctions will not improve the quality of fish that
will be processed. Buyers will not pay premiums for
quality if consumers can not tell the difference. In
fact, "older" fish are even easier to process. One
mast wait at least six hours, until rigor mortis sets
in, before filleting cod, or else one viII get "green"
fillets.• Fish dealer Young (Aberdeen) claimed that
.,aiting about a day was best, otherwise the fish would
flop at the throat cut, discolor, and too much would
have to be trimmed away.. Flesh gradually separates
from the bone after death, and a fish that has been
dead for a long time is definitely easier to fillet.
In Europe, fish processers sti~l bUy the better
quality fish within the B class first, but they do not
pay the premiua of fresh-fish dealers who buy top
quality in classes E and A. When fish are plentiful,
filleters viII buy only B class fish. It is less
expensive and one can hardly notice the difference on a
fillet.
The unsold fish at auctions goes to fish Ileal
plants and the boats receive the minimum price. Thus,
if the fish will not be sold fresh anyway, and if the
lIiriimu. prices are adequate, then boats vill have no
sotivation to produce any better quality than what is
just acceptable to get the minimum price.
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702. Effect~f Fish nand~ing--s1- Auctions~
The major fault of auctions is. that by setting
out the fish for display. the quality drops.
The principle factors affecting fish quality are
storage temperature. care and cleanliness in handling.
and the length of time since capture. It is the proper
storage temperature that is found lacking at fish
auctions. No auction hall visited by the author vas
refrigerated or air-conditioned.. .Fish in some halls is
even stored for twelve hours at 50 OF (Bramsnaes.
1965). Spoilage is five time faster at 50 OF than at
32 OF. and so whitefish loose tvo and a half days of
shelf-life just going through the market.
Danish auctions quit selling fish on Saturdays at
the beginning of 1980. and have now partitioned off
sections of the halls that viII be cooled to 41 op for
fish landed on Saturdays. without ice. even this
temperature would not be sufficient. The body
temperature of fish from the North Sea varies between
32 op and 68 oP. averaging 56 0p. Chilling to 410F is
a less dramatic change. and does less for storage life.
than cooling beef from 98 op to 41 op (Hansen. 1977).
Optimally. fish should be stored in ice vith an ambient
temperature of 40 OPe The ice viII melt. cooling the
fish to 32 OF. the fish viII not freeze. and the
melting ice viII keep the fish from drying out.
Pish on display at auction halls are usually not
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iced since they are bought principally on appearance
and ice would prevent buyers from getting a full view.
If fish can not be iced top and bottom as they should
be, it aight at least be possible to stack the boxes-
In Danish halls, the bottoms of the boxes are iced
before the weighed fish are added, and the boxes are
arranged in rows, stacked five high. This way. only
the top boxes do not have ice above them. and buyers
occasionally lift off the top boxes to make sure that
other boxes are the same. The Danish also passed a law
requiring all fish unloaded during the summer to be
sold within six hours. A second auction, in addition
to the regUlar early-morning one, may be held at the
request of fishermen.
7.3. QualitI stanq~rdization.
When regional systems of minimum prices are
employed, the grading of fish is required to prevent
boats from landing inedible fish and yet collecting the
mini mUll price.•
Quality classifications were introduced in iest
Germany, not only to increase market transparency, but
also for educational reasons. The aim was to draw the
fishermens' attention to quality problems, and show
them what kind of fish they were producing. A
critizisa that Goben (1964) offered, was that it would
be good to further subdivide the B class. In 1960,
. "" ~; '
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fish had the following quality distribution: E, 0.071;
A, 22.841; B, 74.63%; and C, 0.94~. Also, quality
drop, especially for older fish, is mos~ noticeable
during the first few hours after unloading. Thus the
first rated fish often gets a better rating than later
rated fish.•
Laboratory tests, completed on the same day, are
used in West Germany when the captain and the specially
trained veterinarian, who does the grading, do not
agree. Usually organoleptic tests suffice. They are
fast, no special equip.ent is needed, they can be done
anywhere, and the ultimate consumer will judge the fish
on the same basis.
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IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF FISH AUCTIONS TO
NEW ENG1.AND
Previous ~hapters have discussed the functions of
marketing systeas, how prices perform those functions,
and how auctions affect price determination. This
chapter will consider the applicability of fish
auctions to New England.
First, this chapter will discuss the economic
requirements that must be fulfilled for a fish auction
to be viable. Then the social, as well as the
technical, aspects of auctions will be addressed.
1.• !J!£tion -liequirellent.§:.
First, auctions require a sufficient volume of
sales to attract buyers and to pay for the overhead
costs of running the auction. It is beyond the scope
of this stUdy to carry out the port by port in-depth
research needed to discover which New England ports
have sufficient volume and potential competition to
support an auction. A high value of landings in a port
does not imply that many buyers will be attracted,
since the particular species in question may be
industrial fish, or may require other extensive
processing. The fishmeal, canning, and frozen
fish-portion industries are relatively concentrated
(Capalbo, 1976), and have a minimum optimal plant size
that
ports
Where
page 65
is sufficiently large to prevent landings at most
from supporting more than just a few such firms.
the fish will be sold fresh to the ultimate
consumer, as in Denmark, the minimum optimal firm size
is smaller, and it is possible for landings at ports to
support more of such sllall firms.•
Tables 1. 2, and 3 are presented to give the
reader some feel for the volumes landed at the auctions
of Denmark and West Germany, and at some New England
ports.
The first obvious difference between German and
Danish auctions is that the German ones require a much
larger size to be viable. Almost all fish in West
Germany is landed at the four major ports on the north
coast, whereas Danish fish landings are geographically
more dispersed. Due to the distance it must travel
inland, German fish is processed aore ~han Danish fish.
The fresh fish trade is aore extensive in Denmark.
With its relatively lov barriers to entry and small
firm size, the fresh fish trade permits the operation
of many small auctions. In Germany. on the other hand,
the Hamburg auction of 6.990 lIetric tons is considered
to be of marginal size and is subsidized by the city.
The German state of Niedersachsen, which operates the
Cuxhaven auction, discontinued its operation of the
6,085 metric ton Kiel auction. That auction is nov
being run by the local cooperative (Lauerman,
· '- -:.. , ~. '
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Bogense
Esbjerg
Frederikshavn
Faborg
Gilleleje
Glyngore
Grena
Hanstholll
Hirtshals
Hundested
Hvalpsund
Hvide Sande
Jegindo
Kertellinde
Le.vig
Ringkobing
Ronne
Sjaellands Odde
stagen
Strandby
saeby
Thorsllinde
Thyboron
Arhus
100q tg
1,203
16,844
15,287
1,100
9,912
650
7,915
27,106
87,136
2,358
596
21,371
1,908
6,932
5,875
194
538
1,550
56,120
42,580
4,703
3,835
24,746
4,635
1QQQ..lli
2,277
71,287
15,454
2,214
25,331
1,566
37,423
125.. 222
213,521
10,110
869
122_ 117
6,029
9,847
25,238
692
5,209
5,552
168,703
39,897
4,215
27,049
117,840
10,170
(Danish Kinister of ~~sheries, 1978)
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Cuxhaven
Bremerhaven
Hamburg
Kiel
78,140
50,635
6,990
6,085
107,618
68,094
13,846
9,234
(Kutterfisch, 1979)
table 3~
L~ndings at New ,Eng15nd Ports
lIillian
1000 tg g211a~
lIi~lion
E2lli§
New Bedford, f!A
Gloucester, MA
Hew Port, RI
Pt.. Judi'th, HI
Boston. MA
Provincet.ow!4' MA
Port.land, ME
38,700
7'1.,090
9,720
24,440
13,640
10,940
26.820
67.4
29.7
13.2
11.0
10.7
10.3
10.1
86.0
160.. 2
21.6
54.3
30.3
24.. 3
59.6
(National f!arine Pisheries service, 1980)
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Cuxhaven).
Turning to New England. New Bedford and Boston
currently have auctions, and one is very seriously
being considered for Portland (C-E Maguire, Dece.ber
1978). All seven New England ports listed in table 3
have landings of sufficient value to support an
auctioneer. Whether they could attract non-collusive
buyers is less certain4
Auctions do not function . properly without
competitive price formation on the part of buyers. One
way to prevent collusion is to attract so many buyers
that coordination between them becomes very difficult.
Difficulties in agreeing on the most profitable prices
will also increase as the variations in firm size and
their respective price structures increase.
A scarcity of buyers at an auction need not result
in collusion. If only a bank guarantee or similar
bonding is required of potential auction buyers. and if
the fish will ultimately be sold as fresh. barriers to
entry may be held fairly low. The threat of new
entrants may prevent buyers from raising their profit
much above competitive levels. and the competitive
behavior so essential to auction price formation may be
maintained.
All fish species are not used in the same manner.
Some species are typically sold fresh locally. Others
are usually exported, filleted. frozen. canned. or
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processed into fish portions or fishmeal. Buyers also
usually specialize in just one of these marketing
channels~ Thus, where boats make short trips and have
a relatively high ability to switch from fishing one
species to fishing another, as they do in PtG Judith,
fishermen may disrupt collusion in one aarket sector by
fishing for another species~
Collusion at an auction would be much more likely
at ports such as Gloucester, where the concentrated
industries of canning and fishmeal production
predoainate. The large purse seiners landing at
Gloucester also do not lend themselves very easily to
adapta~ion for Qther fisheries.
Again, in-depth studies are needed before
meaningful conclusions can be drawn concerning the
applicability of auctions on a port by port basis.
2. Auc~~on§ in RelatiQa to Othe~_ Inst~tutions~
The first German fish auction was held on November
20, 1886 (Goben, 1964)~ steam power had entered the
fishery, leading to a tremendous increase in harvest,
which could not be handled by the traditional methods
of direct sale, and sale through wholesalers-
Transporta~ion on land had also become much faster,
increasing the potential for fish sale_ Fish auctions
had already proven themselves in England and Bolland,
and their introduc~ion in Germany was an attempt to
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fromovercome the market congestion resulting
technological advances.
In New Bedford r the auction is operated by the
fisher.ens· union as part of its efforts to assure
honesty in the sale of fish and proper payment for its
me.bers.
The first Danish fish auction was not held until
1922. A few were originally private businesses r but
the government now strictly supervises all of thea with
the result that Danish fish is of higher quality than
any other seen by the author.
Auctions do not operate in a void. Sellers aust
be willing to send goods there r buyers must be willing
to attend r and someone must pay for the labor and
facilities involved in the auction itself. Govern.ent
agencies may also be involved in auctions to promote or
enforce their fishery policies.
2.1. !iddle~~
Pirst r the notion that traditional middlemen will
be replaced is false~ Their participation is needed
for the success of an auction r although their
relationsh~p to sellers will change.
Riddle men are sometiaes accused of earning aoney
without "doing" anything. This rests on the
distinction betwe~n production as "doing" soaething r
and trading as not, (Lerner, 1949). Traders, however,
page 71
do no~ earn ~heir money for nothing~ They
1) provide an immediate market for
landed fish.
2) grade the fish.
3) divide bulk catches into smaller lots
for individual consumers.
4) transport fish to markets.
5) stabilize prices in tiaes of glut ·or
scarcity by curing fish~ or by keeping
it in cold s~orage. and selling it
later.
6) provide loans and working capi~al to
fishermen. and
7) transmit market information.
ftany New England ports. particularly in Maine and
connecticut. are too s.all ~o support an auction.
There. middle.en would continue to perform their
functions although their prices would be affected by
those at the nearest auctions. Where selling by
auction is adopted. the primary functions of middlemen
would be to transport fish to remote buyers. even to
other auctions. and to divide lots into portions for
individual consullers.
Bauer (1954) points out that middlemen will be
bypassed unless:
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1) the value customers get is greater
than vhat they must pay for it,
2) the customer is unaware that it is
cheaper to bypass, or
3) institutional arrangements prevent
the bypass.
Auctions may be instrumental in circumventing some
undesirable institutional arrangements, but only with
limited effectiveness. The most remote ports, with the
fewest buyers, and thus the potential for the highest
dealer margins, could not support an auction and would
be the least affected by the introduction of auctions
in the , major ports.
As mentioned before, middlemen themselves can
benefit from the market transparency and higher speed
of sales the auctions afford.
2.2. coope~tives~
Where high volumes are required, and economies of
scale are involved, monopolies or oligopolies vill
result. The aotivation to for_ a cooperative is
usually not to eliminate excess profits, but to divert
them from owners to patrons, and thus provide marketing
services at cost (Shepherd, 1976).
It is entirely possible for a cooperative, such as
the one in Pt. Judtih, to operate an auctio~ In
Cuxhaven, West Germany, the cooperative sells all of
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its fish at the local aaction. The Bremerhaven
cooperative sells a portion of its fish at its local
aaction, sells some directly to other bayers, and
processes some. Where cooperatives do not run the
auction outright, they may provide associated services.
They may own the auction boxes, as in Denmark, or
provide ice. Fishermen in por~s that cannot support
their own auction could ~ake advantage of economies of
size by shipping their ca~ches to the nearest auction
cooperatively.
2.3. Auction Own~rship__gnd 02er~!i~
The possibilities in auc~ion ownership and
operation are almost endless. The New England Fish
Exchange in Bos~on is owned privately, whereas the one
proposed for Portland would be run either by the city
itself, or by a quasi-public entity such as a pier
co••ission or aU~hority (C-E eaguire, 1978).
Fish in Aberdeen, U.K., are all placed in the same
hall and are auctioned in the same sequence in which
they were landed. The auc~ioning. however, is carried
out by several private firms that take ~urns according
to where their boats' catches were placed in the hall-
In scotland. the exis~ence of several auc~ion companies
in one harbor stess from the fac~ ~ha~ ~he salesmen no~
only seli fish, but sell ship chandlery and own shares
in boats as vell. Where a fish salesman owns shares in
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a boat, the boat of course is expected to sell through
him. Otherwise, captains choose an auctioneer on the
basis of personal characteristics: how veIl they get
along, or if they are distant relatives. Auction
co.panies charge 4-51 for their services and there
appear to be only marginal price differences between
thea (~urray, Edinburgh). The large trawler companies
of England, wales and Aberdeen are often vertically
integrated and auctioning there becomes an in-house
thing.
In West Germany, the auctions are owned by the
respective states, and as they are pUblic, anyone aay
sell fish on them. Joining the Cuxhaven cooperative,
boats agree
The Cuxhaven
to sell solely through that cooperative.
co-op has chosen to sell all of its fish
at the local auction. It does not process or store
fish in times of market glut, but has the authority to
keep member boats in port. The Bremeahaven co-op sells
part of the fish at the local auction, and also sells
fish directly to wholesalers as well as to individual
store owners. It has facilities for head-and-gutting,
filleting, and freezing fish. The Bamburg cooperative
also chooses to freeze fish at times, although it does
not appear to be quite so active in marketing. For
their services the co-ops of Cuxhaven, Bremerhaven and
Hamburg charge 1.5', 6~, and 51 on the value of fish.
The one in Cuxhaven is the least expensive since it has
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no processing facilities. It is also the largest. As
well as handling fish, German cooperatives provide
boats with credit and supplies.
The only important issue in auction ownership and
operation is that all related activities be performed
fairly by a trusted party. Unfortunately, this is
where existing New England auctions fail. Since~here
is no official inspection system, some Boston fishermen
accuse buyers of down-grading good fish in order to
discipline fishermen that become too independent
(Boeri, 1976). The privately owned Nev England Fish
Exchange, which runs the Boston auction, is not seen by
the fishermen as a neutral party vhich protects their
rights..
Dealers weigh the fish in Nev Bedford on their own
scales, and fisher.en there believe that buyers tamper
with the scales.. The fleet vas tied up in 19q7 and
• again in 1971 to protest.. Neither time were fisher.en
successful in having weigh-outs supervised by bondsmen,
or in getting city-inspected scales that display weight
without requiring the manipulation of weights..
3. ~ggesteg Rules--Alls..-!!~ndl~-f3iocedures..
One of the primary objectives of this study was to
determine which set of rules and handling procedures
vould be most likely to allow accurate price formation
at New England fish auctions.
.... .-:~ ..
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First, to promute competition among as many buyers
as possible, fish should be displayed on the auction
floor in boxes of standard weight, and a minimum
purchase of only one box should be permitted. Where
only small ~olumes of fish are landed, a maximum lot
size may also be desirable. This would gi~e small
buyers a chance to buy fish without paying a premium to
beat large dealers, that would buy the entire block.
Entry should be as tree as possible, allowing any
boat and even any wholesaler to sell fish, and
requiring only a bank guarantee or similar bonding on
the part of potential buyers. Required membership and
user fees, which in Boston exceed nine hundred dollars
per year for a buyer who does not have a place of
business on the pier, are very discriminatory against
small buyers. All auction revenue should be based on
either the value or volume of fish sold, so as to be
nondiscriminatory. Charging a percentage on value
would align the auctioneer's interests with those of
the fisher_en. A deposit on auction boxes, and a small
fee to cover box sterilization and ice may also be
charged.
Bidding could be either ascending or descending.
Descending systems are faster and lend themselves to
later conversion to remote and electronic methods, but
an ascending system may feel more natural to New
England buyers.
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The grading of fish would inwolve additional
expenses, but would be worthwhile for market
transparency and educational purposes4
Due to the general inelasticity of demand for food
fish, (Hubner, 1971), fluctuations in landings will
cause larger fluctuations in auction prices4 Where the
fluc~uations are sewere, fishermen may wish to protect
themselves by instituting a systea of minimum prices.
Such a systea is most effective if done on a regional
basis, requires fish to be graded, and should include
money for equalization.
The most efficient and hygienic handling of fish
obserwed by the author occured in Denmark. So that
more boats could be unloaded simultaneously, boats were
not docked broadside to the hall, but at an angle (see
figure 1). Conweyor belts carry fish into the hall,
dumping it into bins, and a second conveyor belt
underneath carries ~he ice back out. Four men stand at
each set of bins, tossing fish of different sizes and
grades into various buckets on a set of rollers before
thea (figure 2). When the buckets appear to contain 50
kilogram, they are rolled across scales by other
employees to make sure the weigh~ is exac~. The fish
are then dumped into boxes with fresh ice on the
bottom_
Contrary to West Germany, where boxes are arranged
in huge blocks, and where every box is visible but
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figure 1.
Angular Docking of Fishing
Boats, Esbjerg, Denmark
harbor
" - ..,, ..
figure 2.
Sorting and ~~ighing Arrangement
Esbjerg, Dennark
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requires that one walk on box edges to get to the
middle, Danish boxes are stacked five high in rovs tvo
deep. This uses less hall space and puts ice above all
but the top fish. Buyers may remove the top boxes to
make sure that the stacks are uniform throughout, and
are still only required to buy one box at tha minimum.
Whereas German auc~ions employ extra workers who run
about the boxes dropping company slips into purchased
boxes, buyers have easy access to boxes in Denmark and
do it themselves~ Most importantly, the stacking of
boxes speeds the transportation of boxes within the
hall. Forklifts can carry two stacks, or ten boxes, at
a time whether they are palletized, as in Hvide Sande,
or not, as in Esbjerg. Forklifts speed the fish from
the scales to the auction floor for bidding, and then
right onto buyer trucks. It is co••on, at Danish
auctions, to see bidding in progress in one portion of
the hall, and si.ultaneously see fish being off-loaded
in a second portion, while sold fish is already removed
fro. the third.
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v. CONCLUSION
This study attempted to determine whether fish
auctions would improve the market position of
commercial fishermen. Of particular interest was the
effect of auctions on price and on fish quality.
The role of prices in modern economies was
outlined r as well as the limitations of price system~
The specific rules and procedures at existing fish
auctions vere compiled r and their effects on price
formation vere discussed.
Auctions may be employed to break certain barriers
to entrYr but will not create new competition where
there is no potential. They are dependent on buyer
competition for price formation and require a minimum
value of sales to carry overhead costs. The overhead
costs can be decreased to almost nothing if the auction
is held on the dock before the catch is unloaded-
However r dividing the block into smaller lots and
increasing the number of sales increases the chances of
establishing prices at the theorectical equilibrium.
Sorting the fish by species r sizer and qualitYr into
boxes of standard weight r increases market transparency
and increases competition by allowing smaller buyers to
participate. Therefore r the author suggests that the
feasibility of displaying fish before sale at the New
Bedford and Boston auctions be investigated.
Since crews are paid on a share basis r they may
... ~ :;::.
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want their catch to be sold at an auction to prevent
dishonest dealings between their captain and fish
buyers,.
The use of auctions has often been justified
solely on the grounds that they are fast and require
little seller involvement. Fish is highly perishable
and its value changes daily, according to the volumes
landed. Since auctions are a useful value detecting
device, and since they are fast, both buyers and
sellers may benefit from the institution of additional
auctions in New England. The primary limitation of Nev
England fish auctions appears to be the collusive
behavior of buyers. Studies must be conducted on a
port-by-port basis, to determine which ports present
sufficient potential co.petition among buyers, before
the initiation of any further auctions would be
recommended.
Both the English (ascending-bid) and the Dutch
(descending-bid) systems work wel: at fish auctions_
The Dutch system appears to be faster, and can easily
be converted to electronic methods, but Bew England
participants may feel more comfortable with the English
syst.em..
~ini.u. prices can be used by fishermen to protect
t.hemselves from low prices at auct.ions. However, these
reserve prices have litle meaning unless fishermen can
store t.heir fish or sell them for at least that price
individuals, cooperatives, and
agencies currently operate fish auctions.
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on other markets. Where minimum prices are
administered on a regional basis, they should include a
system of equalization. Otherwise, when the market is
glutted, vertically integrated firms, which wholesale
fish as well as own boats, will have an advantage over
others. These firms will be able to avoid fishmeal
prices by buying their fish back and diverting it to
other markets at less of a price loss.
The grading of fish is required for Any regional
system of price minimums that includes equalization.
This is to prevent boats fro. being paid for fish that
was improperly handled and that was never expected to
be sold. Even where it is not required, the grading of
fish is recollmended as it will help educate fishermen
to care for fish properly, and because it increases
market transparency.
Fish quality may not be improved as much by
auctions as Wilson (1919) suggested. First, quality
premiums are only iaportant for fresh fish; processers
will only pay for fish that just passes their minimum
requirements. Secondly, prices usually fluctuate more
according to changes in the volume landed than
according to differences in quality. As a result,
fishermen may focus their attention on volumes and not
quality.
Private
governmental
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It is important that both actual and perceived honesty
be lIIaintained.
Fin~lly, rules and handling procedures were
suggested. These may provide guidance for the
improvement of New England's two existing fish
auctions, and for the one being planned in Portland.
SELECTED REFERENCES
Alchian, Armen A•• 1969. "Information Costs, Pricing ,
and Resource Une mploy.ent.• " jestern ~Qnomis:
~Qyrna!L 7:2 (June), p.109-28.
Allen, B. T.. 1969. nConcentration and Economic
Progress: Note" A.eI:ic~n ~211~ Eevi~ 59
p.• 600-04.
A.ihud, Yokov, ed•• 1976. ~!q~1ng ~ !Y£~2ning~
frocur~ment and A~locat~qn. New York: New York
University Press.
Bain, Joe 5.. 1965. Ba~riers i2 ~ Competition~ 3rd.
ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
------. 1968. Industria! Orqan~~ation~ 2nd. ed. New
York: Wiley and Sons.
Bauer, P. T. and lamey, B.S•• 1962. "The Economics of
Marketing Reform. II JouI;;P.sl. 21 Political ~~onomI&
62 p.210-35.
Baumol, W. J•• 1959. ~us~De§§ ~ehaviour, Valg~ and
Growth~ Harcourt, Brace and world.
Beier, Frederick J. and Stern, Louis if... 1969. "Pover
in the Channel of Distribution." in Q~2!:ribut:i:Qn
~hannel~ BehsvioY~sl Dimensi2n~ Edited by Louis
v. Stern.. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company..
Boeri, David and Gibson, James.. 1976. ~ll 11 GQod-BI~&
~~ddo~ camden, Maine: International Marine
PUblishing Company.
Bonn, Ellen ft .... 1916. ~~~keting Alt!~~atives !Q~
Agriculture. Ithaca, Nev York: Cornell University~
Bralllsnaes, F.._ 1965 .. "Handling of Fresh Fish".. Pish S§
~4 edited by George Borgstrom. Nev York:
Accadellic Press.
Brittan, Samuel. 1915.. Participation vitho~~ poli~ics:
!l! Anailili II ill Nat~ and the~ Q! Market§:.
London: The Institute of Economic Affairs.
Cassady, Ralph. 1961. A~qtion§ and !Y£!ionee~ing~
Berkeley: University of California Press.
capalbo, Susan Harie.. 1916 .. "An Analysis of Food Fish
Processing sector.." Unpublished Masters Thesis
University of Rhode Island, Kingston.
.,.._~..
C-E Maguire, Inc.. 1978. "Towards a Fisheries
Development Strategy for Maine." Portland, !aine,
January.
------ 1978. "Portland Fish Pier Feasibility Study."
Portland, Maine, December.
Clark, John ~aurice_ 1955. ~ Ethical Basi~ 2!
~~~~ ~~om. iestport, Connecticut: Kazanjian
Economics Foundatione
Dahl, Dale C., and Hammond. Jerome W•• 1977. ~.!~ ~~g
r.r~~ !nalysis~ New York: McgraW-Hill.
Danish Kinister of Fisheries. 1978. liskeriberetning
for ~~ 1971~ Copenhagen, Denmarke
Davis, J. Ronnie and Hulett, Joe R•• 1977. !n !nalY~i~
21 ttsrk~ t~iluI~ Gainsville: The University
Presses of Florida.
Deutsch. M•• 1960. "The Effect of Motivational
Orientation opon Trust and Suspicion~" Hqman
Relati2n~ 13 p-123-40.
Dorward. N40 1977. "Market Struct~re and Buyer
Loyalty." Journal of Industria! ~~cs& 26:2
(DeCember), p.115-35.
Ferguson, C. E. and Maurice, s. Charles. 1978. Economic
!nalY§is~ Homevood. Illinois: Richard Do Irvin,
Inc••
Firth, Raymond. 1966. ~alaI Fi~berm§~ ~~ ~asant
~~~~ London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Fish, George and Dixon, Donald, ed•• 1967. Theories for
~~~ket S!ste~ Nev York: Harper & Rov.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations. 1971. "Fish Inspection Programs." I!Q
E::i~9:eri§2 ~.e.2tt2 No 114, ROlBe, Italy,.
Goben, Heinz. 1964. DI~~ und !Ynk~ion~~~nhange
sY! g~ Deitschen Seefischaa~!~ und A~satzpunk~~
fur 2§ine Rationalisierung~ Hamburg, West Ger.any:
Verlag Paul Parey.
Gorga, Caaine, ~~ "The Economic Feasibility of
Assuring u.s. Grade A Quality of Fresh Seaf~ds to
the Consu~er." ~arine Fisheri~ ~e!iev& (July),
p.20-27..
Hansen, Poul. 1977. "pac~aging and Distribution of
Fresh Fish." Paper presented at the Seainar on
Fish Distribution in the Future, Skive, Denmark,
June 15.
. ... .~.
Hayek, F. A._ 1945. "The Use of Knowledge in Society_"
!l!!~~ ~n2.!!ic Review,L 35 (September) ,
p.519-30.
Henderson, Dennis R. ~~~~ 1976. ~srketing ~oql~~§
~ng !lternstivesi Th~ !hI and y~ of s Feed~
~le Tele~qctio~ Columbus: Ohio Cooperative
Extension Service.
Hubner, Wolfgang and Hulse.eyer, Friedrick. 1971.
qkon2.isch~ frobl~ de~ ~fischehei. Hamburg:
Verlag Paul Parey.
Izraeli, D.; Izraeli, D. N.; and Zif, J •• 1977.
"Integrative Processes in Agricultural Marketing
Channels." !£~~ of ~arketing ~cien£~ JouAalL
5:3 p.203-20.
Jacquellin, A. P.. 1972.. "Market Structure and the
Firm's 8arket Pover." Journal of Ind~§trial
~cono~i~ 20 ~.122-34_
Kapp, K. William. 1971. ~ Social ~2sts of fhivate
EnterRrise. Nev York: Schoken Books.
Kutterfisch. 1979. "Auktionsmengen der vier
Seefischmarkte." Bamburg. (~imeographed).
Larson. D~ A•• 1978. "An Empirical Test of the
Relationship between Market Conduct and Vertical
Integration." Imiustrlli Qrganizatiqn ~;~~L 6:1
p.. 11-74..
Leftwich, Richard H__ 1966. The Pri~ Sys~~ ang
l!eso9~£~ Allocati~ 3rd.. ed. New York: Holt.
Rinehart and Winston.
Lele. Uma J. 1916. "Consideration Belated to Optimum
Pricing and Marketing Strategies in Rural
Development." in Qec~§ion 11S&ill and ~lculture.
Edited by Theodo=e Dams and Kenneth Hunt. Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press..
Lerner. Abba. 1949_ "The f!yth of the Parasitic
Middleman." ~QmmentarYL 8 (July). p.45-51.
Lindbeck. Assar. 1977. I~e foliti~a! Econom~ of ~ !~
~~ 2nd. ed. New York: Harper & Row.
Mansfield~ Edwin. 1968. Ih§ E~Qnomi~~ of I!£hnQlogi£s!
~~ New York: W. i. Norton & Company.
!cGivney. William T._ 1973. "A Retail Fresh Finfish
!arket Channel." Unpublished !asters Thesis,
University of Rhode Island. Kingston-
Modigliania, Franco. 1958. "New Developments on
Oligopoly Fron~" 4Q~~al of Political ~no.IL 66
p. 21 S-32ca
Konsen, R. J. at. al~ _ 1968. "The Effect of separation
of ownership and C~ntrol on the Performance of the
Large Firm." Quarte~lI ~QYJ;pal of ~Q!!.QllicsL 82
p.43S-S1..
Mourier, G. L•• and Sorensen, s. N•• 1976. ~~ of
~oee~~~ in the Fishing !ndu~!~~ - Qenma~
Co••ission of the European COIIMunities.
National Marine Fishery Service. 1980.• fisherie~ of ill
Yni!ed states 1212~ Washington D. C-.
National Karine Fishery Service. 1980. "Quality Control
for Fishery Products", and «n, S. Exports of
Fishery Products". l~ Fi§h Fact~ IS2 and 'S5.
Chicago: National Consuaer Education Services
O=fice..
Needham, D. 1976. "Entry Barriers and Non-Price Aspects
of Firm's Behaviour." !lou&nal of Industris!
Econo~~cs&. 25 p.29-43.
Nichols, John, P.. 1978. ~rketinq Q~der~ : ~Q!~nti~~
!Wic~~ion j;Q. l1yketing P~obltl§ of the SeafQ2S
I~qust~~ college Station: Texas A & ~ ~niversitYq
------, ~t. a 1....
~ishe~!!!en.
University.
1980. ~~g !l~rna~iv~ !Q.£
College Station: Texas A & K
Nicosia, F. M•• 1962. "Karketing and Alderson's
Functionalism". Ihe ~ournal of Busines§L 35:4
(October), p403-13.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and DeYelopment.
1966. Pri~~ SIst~ at the Landing§ S~age in
l~shing Industrie2 of Q~ ~~.be~ ~ountrie5.
Paris.
Peterson, Susan, and Smith, Leah. 1979. "Mev England
Fishing, Processing and Distribution-" Unpublished
Report for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Woods Hole Oceanographic
Inst'itute.
pickering, J. F. 1974. Indust~ial StructuIe ~g Karke!
conduct~ London; Kartin Robertson & Co.
••. . _ ..)7: ..
pollnac. R. B.. 1980. "The R~le of Middlemen as
Perceived by S.all-Scale Fishermen in the Gulf of
Nicoya, Costa Rica." Manuscript, University of
Rhode Island, Kinston.
Quinn, Naomi. 1978_ "Do ~fantse Fish Sellers Estima~e
Probabilities in their Heads?" AmericsJ!
llhnoloqist&, 5~ 2 (f!ayt, p.• 206-27..
Schumpe~er, Joseph A.. 1950. CaR~tali§m, Socialism, snS
~mocr~gI~ 3rd. ed. Nev York: Harper & Row.
Shank, Michael Don. 1979. "An Evaluation of the ~arket
structure and Performance of the Wholesale
Kerchant sector of the Public Fresh Fish Marketing
System of EI Salvador.. " unpublished Kasters
Thesis, University of Rhode Island, Kingston..
Shepherd, Geoffrey S.; Futrell, Gene A.; and strain. J~
Robert. 1916. ~rketing laI~ Products. 6th ed-
Ames, Iova: Iova S~ate University Press.
Shubik, Martin_ 1910_ "On Different Methods of
Allocating Resources." Klklos&, 23:2 p.. 332-31.
Smith, Carol l •• 1916. Regional ~UAlysis. New York:
Academic Press.
Smith, Vernon 1-. 1964. "Effect of !arket Organization
on competitive Equilibrium." ~artE!r1:l: ~urn5!:l of
Econom!£2L 78 (Kay), p.181-201.
Sommers, ~ontrose S. and Kernan, Jerome B. ed. 1968.
~omEsra~iv~ ~rke1i~ System§l ! ~yl~g£5!
AEEroaqh. New York: Appleton-century-Crofts.
Sosnick, stephen H._ 1963. "Bidding Strategy at
Ordinary Auctions". Jou~nll Q£ Farm fCconomic§L
45: 1 (February), p.163-82..
Southworth. Herman !_ and Johnston, Bruce F. ed. 1916~
Agricultural '~!QE!~ ~ Economic Growth~
Ithaca. Nev York: Cornell University Press_
Taylor, R. A•• 1960_ !h~ Economics of whi~e !!§h
Qist~~butioD ia Great ~~ita~ London: Gerald
Duckworth.
u.s. v. San pedro Fish Exchange. 1941. 0.5. District
Court, Southern District of California, Centra1
Division, civil action No 1772-B, Septe.ber 15.
n, S. v. Seattle pish Exchange, Inc... 1942.. 0.. S. District
Court, iestern District of washington, Northern
Division, civil action No 612, November 10.
Vidaeus, Lars Olov. 1977. "Analysis of Foreign Demand
for u.s. Fisheries Jurisdiction with an
Application to the Nev England Herring Resources."
Un~ublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Rhode Island, Kingston.
ienders, J. T. 1971. "Eccess Capacity as a Barrier to
Entry." Journal of Industrial ~omic~
(Novellber) p.1~-19.•
White Fish Authority. 1975. "Common Fisheries Policy -
A Review Tvo Years on." li2h Indust~ Review£
Edinburgh, June.
Wilson, James. 1979. "Fish Auctions." 115ill ~omllerc4,a.t
~~i§~ Septellber, October.•
INTEBVIEWS
Q§nlla~~L-~nuary 1!=20L-~~
Elleman r Grete. Fisheriministerie~s Industritilsyn r
Copenhagen.
Hecht. Dansk Piskeriforening r Copenhagen.
Jensen r Marjun. Fiskeriministeriets
Forsogslaboratorium r Danmarks Tekniste Hojskule r
Lyngby.
Sorensen r Soren. Fikerikonsnlent r Dansk
Fiskeriforening r Copenhagen.
Sorrig r ThomaS4 Danske Fiskeres Producent organisation r
B~abrand.
Nielson r !ogens. Fiskeriainisterier r copenhagen.
Vaerno r Henning. Auction Director r Hvide Sanae.
Netherlands. Jan!!an-lh 198Q.:,
Schilling_ Auctioneer r Ijmuiden.
Yn;ted _K!nggO!L_-4~~1=3Q&_1280~
Mills. Ian. Hull college of Higher Education.
Murray. Richard. Whitefish Authority. Edinburgh.
Robinson. Auctioneer. Hull.
Witty. John. Hull College of Higher Education.
Young. Peter. Pish Merchant. Aberdeen.
!6.~
Holm~en. Andreas. University of Rhode Island. Kingston.
December 1980.
Nichols. John. Texas A & M, College Station. November
1979.
Wilson. James. University of Maine. Orono. November
1979.
• ... ·~1·
!~st__2g~!AnY. ~snua~Y-l~13£__ 198Q~
Ahlf. Auctioneer, Cuxhaven~
Bassiner. Fish Store Owner, Hamburg - Wedel.
Izleppesch. Kutterfisch - Verwertung, Finkenwerder
Lubecker - Bucht, Hamburg.
Lauerman, Dieter. Director, Kutterfisch Cuxhaven eG.
Rohlde. Auction Director, Hamburg.
Schroder. Liegenschaftsverwaltung, Seefischaarkt
Cuxhaven G.bH~
Sommer4 Institute fur Landwirschaftliche
Karktforschung, Braunschweig.
Wehrman. Pisherei Wissenschaftliches Institute,
Bamburg.
